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ABSTRACT
Since the Korean War there has been a fierce military competition between
the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK). The DPRK has committed over 10 percent of its GNP since 1963 to
defense expenditures, whereas, the ROK has spent a relatively small portion (3-6
percent) of GNP over the same period. Because the U.S. plans to withdraw from
the ROK in the near future, a heavy burden will be imposed upon the ROK
Government to maintain its national defense. The U.S. withdrawal will result in
the delay of achieving a military balance in the Korean Peninsula. Under these
conditions, it becomes essential to find the most efficient allocation of the defense
budget so as to get the most high-tech weapons, and achieve military balance
with the DPRK at the soonest possible time. The purpose of this thesis is to
compute the service levels for critical items with the present budget, and to de-
termine whether the budget is used effectively in the ROK Army. To solve the
problem, the cost analysis method is utilized. An application of this methodology
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I. INTRODUCTION
The economies of all countries are becoming more interrelated. The devel-
oping world economy is complex and variable. Each country has to plan to solve
its economic problems by itself.
Moreover, the more the world economy develops, the closer and more com-
plex the world becomes. Because of this reason, the changes of one area influence
the other areas very rapidly in many respects, such as the economy, the politics,
the community, the culture, etc.
The efforts for detente between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Un-
ion and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in January 1990, indicated new changes
in the European region. Also, the demonstration for democracy by the eastern
Europeans portend new changes in the world economic and political balance.
This turn of events makes people in the U.S. believe that it is the time to solve
their economic problems by decreasing the defense budget by withdrawing or re-
ducing U.S. personnel and equipment not only in the continental United States
(CONUS) but also in Western Europe and other foreign countries.
As a result, the U.S. government plans to close some military bases in
CONUS and overseas. Among these bases are two Air Force bases in the Re-
public of Korea (ROK). These bases play a very important role in the defense
of ROK from North Korea. Therefore, the ROK government is faced with the
problem of preparing a new strategy for self-defense.
The strain of additional defense spending comes to ROK at a critical time,
when it is becoming a developed country. The change of the U.S. defense strat-
egy against the communist countries forces ROK to commit more actual funds
and necessitates more efficient application of assets to achieve its new strategy.
In order to accomplish this, the following things must be accomplished:
* Modernization of the military forces of ROK
M Nlaintenance of the minimum military forces to prevent war in the Korean
Peninsula
* Efficient management of war materials within the available budget
Since the modernization of military forces and force reductions are beyond
the scope of this study, this thesis will focus on the efficient management of war
materials.
The purpose of this thesis is to find the service levels of critical items in the
ROK Army within the present budget, examine whether the budget is being used
effectively, and show how the changes in the service level affect the budget. The
cost analysis method is used to determine answers for these questions.
Chapter II describes the history and military competition between the two
Korcas after the Korean war, and the effects of the U.S. withdrawal from the
ROK.
Chapter III discusses the ROK logistics during the Korean War, introduces
the inventory system of the ROK Army, and examines the problems and the
methodology to solve them.
Chapter IV explains the cost analysis methodology and shows how to apply
it to the real world by use of an illustration. Since the real data is not available
from the ROK, some assumptions, simplifications, and approximations are used
when applying the theory to the illustration.
Chapter V presents the conclusion. It emphasizes that for the self-defense of
the ROK, the critical issue is to use the budget effectively. It also concludes that





In November 1943 at the Cairo Conference, the Allied powers agreed that
after the surrender of Japan, Korea should become "free and independent." In
July 1945 this was reconfirmed by the Potsdam Declaration. However, the fate
of Korea changed overnight. At the 1945 Yalta Conference, the leaders of the
U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union reached a secret agreement which in-
cluded dividing Korea into two parts along the 38th parallel, in order to facilitate
the disarmament of the Japanese Forces [Ref. 1: p. 409].
In spite of Korean objections, as soon as Japan surrendered on 15 August
1945 the Soviet Union dispatched its forces to the area north of the 38th parallel,
in accordance with the Yalta agreement.
The Soviet Union established a military government which helped to solidify
the North Korean Communist regime. The U.S. forces moved into the area south
of the 38th parallel, and established another military government. The U.S.
claimed, however, that the 38th parallel was not a political demarcation, but a
temporary expedient to facilitate military operations. When the Soviet Union
blocked efforts to reunite Korea, a conference of foreign ministers convened to
settle the matter [Ref. 2: pp. 170-71].
An agreement was reached stating that Korea would become independent
after a 5 year trusteeship of 4 countries: U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union
and China. Although the Soviet Union agreed to this joint trusteeship, it never
came into being because the Soviet Union moved to prevent it.
In 1947 the United Nati-ns mandated that free elections should be held
throughout the Korean Peninsula. The United Nations Temporary Commission
on Korea was prevented from entering the area north of the 38th parallel, how-
ever. So on May 10, 1948, voting was conducted only in the southern half of the
country, which was occupied by the U.S. The South Koreans formed the Re-
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public of Korea (ROK) in May 1948, making Seoul the capital. The Republic
was formally acclaimed on August 15, 1948. The first president was Rhee.
Meanwhile, in the north, Kim I1-Sung, previously situated in Pyongyang since
October 1945 as the leader of the emigre forces, was trained by the Soviet Union
to prepare for an eventual takeover. He established his dominance as premier
when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was set up in Sep-
tember 1948.
The U.S. forces were withdrawn from the ROK by mid-1949, and the new
state was not included within the U.S./Asian defense perimeter. This contrasted
sharply with a Soviet-supported military buildup that was taking place in the
DPRK.
At the time of outbreak of the Korean War, on 25 June 1950, the DPRK
Army numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, vastly outnumbering the
under-equipped forces of the ROK. Therefore, ROK forces were reinforced
principally by U.S. troops, and by military units of other United Nations coun-
tries.
After three years of war, peace talks were initiated. On July 27, 1953, a
cease-fire agreement was signed at the village of Panmunjom. No actual peace
treaty has ever been worked out between the two sides, and thus north and south
still remain in a technical state of war [Ref. 3: p. 529].
B. MILITARY COMPETITION
Military competition began early between the ROK and the DPRK. By
February 1948, the DPRK established a full-fledged Soviet-style army with
200,000 regular soliders, including infantry, armoured troops, engineers, signals,
ordinance and rear services.
Conversely, the ROK had about 50,500 soldiers in August 1948. It was
modelled on the U.S. Army. Its main arms and services were then, and remain
today, the infantry, armour, engineers, signal corps, ordinance corps, and
quartermaster corps.
Arms transfer to the ROK and the DPRK played a significant role to
strengthen and develop their military forces. Before they were able to produce
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arms, they were absolutely dependent on shipments from other countries, espe-
cially the U.S. for the ROK, and the Soviet Union for the DPRK.
1. Republic of Korea
Between 1945 and 1950, the ROK found itself part of the U.S. "fc:ward
defense areas." The U.S. approach to the ROK before the outbreak of the
Korean War could best be described as ambivalent.
Because of the aggressive attitude of the Rhee government, which desired
to reunify the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. Occupation Army equipped the ROK
with only light arms and mortars, and provided some technical training. The
U.S. took "the precaution to arm the ROK Army only with light defensive
weapons to preclude any temptation to invade the DPRK [Ref. 4: p. 140].
[he Kocan War, which began on June 25, 1950 and ended on July 27,
1953. shifted the U.S. military assistance program for the ROK from limited as-
sistance to direct intervention and massive aid. During this time, the ROK re-
ceived tremendous amounts of military equipment.
This aid included over 800 tanks and the bulk of infantry weapons. It
did not include any aircraft. The ROK forces relied totally on the U.S. for air
support.
The R K forces emerged from the war in marginally better condition
than did those of the DPRK. Although the ROK Army was intact, it relied
heavily on U.S. support. The ROK Air Force consisted only of limited numbers
of older propeller-type aircraft, and the ROK Navy emerged from the war virtu-
ally unchanged.
After the Korean War, the armistice agreement prohibited the introduc-
tion of new weapons to the ROK, and froze combat aircraft at the existing level.
This agreement did not last long.
From July 1953 through 1960, the U.S. policy was to provide nuclear
deterrence, and to shift the burden of limited conventional deterrence to local
forces. This caused the military aid to the ROK to rise steadily throughout the
1950's, peaking between 1958 and 1960 [Ref. 4: p. 410].
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Actual arms transfers to the ROK during the 1950's were mostly World
War II surplus items. Those were simple weapons which required only minimal
maintenance and limited complex spare parts. Although they were outdated in
the U.S., they filled the needs of the ROK Army and were commensurate with
the ROK maintenance capabilities [Ref. 5: p. 238].
The 1960's can be divided into two parts: Pre-Vietnam War (1960-1965)
and the Vietnam War Period (1965-1970). During this decade, the U.S. percep-
tion of the threat in Asia was transferred from the ROK to South East Asia. This
led to a shift in U.S. military aid, which caused significant fluctuations in military
aid to the ROK. The military aid to the ROK peaked in 1961, and not until 1968
did it again reach the previous high.
During this decade, the arms transfer to the ROK included the following
advanced weapon systems: the Nike Hercules, Honest John, and Hawk missiles,
sixty F-86 fighters and approximately 700 advanced Sidewinder air-to-air mis-
siles.
In spite of the increased involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam in 1965,
military aid to the ROK was not halted. In 1965 F-5 Freedom Fighters were
delivered to the ROK to replace F-86's, in response to DPRK - created incidents
along the cease-fire line and in the ROK itself. The DPRK also attacked U.S.
forces: the USS Pueblo was captured and an EC-121 reconnaissance plane was
shot down.
Aid for operations and maintenance increased significantly in 1969 and
1970. In 1969, S1OO million was requested over and above the appropriations to
update anti-aircraft systems, patrol boats, and radars. This also authorized a
squadron of F-4E Phantoms [Ref. 4: p. 417].
In 1970's changes in the relationship between the ROK and the DPRK
began. The most important event of the early seventies was the resumption of
unification talks in 1972. These were culminated by the Joint Communique of
July 4, 1972. Although these talks looked promising, they were virtually doomed
from the start.
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Moreover, President Park's (the third ROK president) reelection became
a political issue in the U.S. Congress, and it resulted in a cut-back of military aid.
Congress held true to its threat by approving only S146 million in military grants
in 1975. An additional S20 million was withheld until the U.S. president was
satisfied that political rights were restored [Ref. 6: p. 280]. This withheld aid
was never subsequently allocated.
Events that transpired in 1975 and early 1976 caused the U.S. restriction
to be lifted. A second tunnel was discovered under the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
in 1975. The pivotal event, however, was the axe-slaying of U.S. Army personnel
at Panmunjom on August 18, 1976. As a result, U.S. military aid to the ROK
jumped from S146 million in 1975 to over S230 million in 1976.
An effort to upgrade the ROK forces was initiated in 1976 with the five
year Force Improvement Plan (FIP). This plan was designed to reduce the defi-
ciencies and to modernize the ROK forces with a S5.5 billion investment. Addi-
tionally, in 1979 the U.S. provided S275 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
credits.
During the 1970's, arms transfers were mostly for defensive arms. The
only offensive air capability was provided by the 47 F-4DjE aircraft delivered in
1971-1977. The capabilities for ROK Army were improved by the transfer of
over 500 M-48 tanks which the ROK converted to M-48 A-5's.
2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The Soviet Union entirely dominated the DPRK prior to the Korean
War. They were the sole supplier of arms, ammunition, gasoline, vehicles and
other military items. The Soviet aid is established to have been S56 million be-
tween 1945 and 1950 [Ref. 7: p. 241].
After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1949, the DPRK was pro-
vided with continued large deliveries of tanks, trucks, artillery, and war planes
[Ref. 4: p. 192].
Furthermore, the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War led to a
shift of the Chinese support from ROK to DPRK. Nevertheless, due to the Civil
War China was exhausted, and the Chinese Communists were unable to support
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the DPRK with war material. Thus, China played no significant role in arms
transfers during this period.
During the Korean War, military aid to the DPRK consisted mainly of
aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Although the DPRK received massive Soviet and
Chinese support, their armed forces were decimated by the war. Their army
suffered enormous casualties and equipment losses. Similarly, their Air Corps
had to completely regroup and retrain due to the enormous losses suffered in the
early stages of the war [Ref. 4: p. 41 1].
The period following the Korean War was used by Kim II-Sung, the dic-
tator of DPRK, to reconsolidate his political power. DPRK channeled most of
their resentment -- generated by their failure in the Korean War -- toward the
Soviet Union, because of their initiation of the armistice process.
Kim voiced his disappioval of the Soviets by embarking on an independ-
ent path of reconstruction without prior Soviet Union approval. These effects
were greatly aided by the Chinese military presence in the DPRK until 1958.
Despite this antagonism, the Soviet Union remained the sole supplier of major
weapons, and thereby maintained greater influence through the summer of 1958
[Ref. 8: pp. 20-26].
The Soviets trained the North Koreans with modern equipment between
1955 and 1957. Once trained, the DPRK received 20 11-28's in 1955 and 100
MIG-17's from 1956 to 1958. In 1959 China supplied the DPRK with 80
M IG- 17's, and began delivery of 1-28's. Chinese support continued in 1958-1959
with the transfer of 44 11-28's, 20 Yak-18's, and Shenyan F-4 aircraft. China also
introduced the first supersonic aircraft, the MIG-19, to the DPRK in 1959. Be-
tween 1957 and 1960, China increased the DPRK naval capability with the
transfer of 24 mine sweepers [Ref. 4: p. 364].
From 1953 to 1960 aid to DPRK shifted from being completely Soviet to
being mostly Chinese. Consequently, the Chinese influence grew. The change
was largely due to increased Chinese arms production capability, and resentment
over Soviet pressure to accept the cease-fire.
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The 1960's could be divided into two periods: stronger ties to China up
to 1965, and thereafter a shift back to the Soviet Union. The DPRK concluded
a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union in 1961. This was not an accept-
ance of Soviet dominance, however, for in this same year Kim introduced his
Seven-year Economic Development Plan, defying a Soviet attempt to coordinate
and direct all socialist planning efforts. The combination of defiance in economic
planning, and the refusal to accept Soviet military command dominance, resulted
in the cancellation of all Soviet aid [Ref. 4: p. 413].
Although the DPRK lost their Soviet support, they found wholehearted
Chinese support in the early 1960's. China increased its supply of jet fuel and
spare aircraft parts to the DPRK in the same period. The DPRK reciprocated
by reorganizing its Air Force along Chinese lines. By 1963, the DPRK had re-
ceived 400 Chinese built aircraft, including Shenyang 4 (MIG-17), MIG-15's, and
11-28's
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, by
1964 the DPRK's Air Force had expanded to 465 combat aircraft. During the
early sixties, the DPRK military strength exceeded the ROK's by 200-400 percent
[Ref. 4: pp. 413-14].
From 1965 the relationship between the DPRK and the Soviet Union
began to improve. After the meeting between Soviet premier Kosygin and Kim
Il-Sung, Soviet support started to be increased again. Modern equipment soon
was being shipped to the DPRK, included MIG-21's and SA-2's. Heq v.v equip-
mcnt, including heavy field artillery, was provided for the DPRK ground forces
to offset modernizations in the ROK Army [Ref. 4: p. 414].
As a result of substantial Soviet military aid, by 1967 the DPRK Air
Force had over 500 combat aircraft, including 21 MIG-21's, 350 MIG-17's, 80
MIG-15's. Also provided were 10 Air-Defense complexes, including 500 SA-2
missiles. Almost all of DPRK's heavy army equipment was Soviet supplied
[Ref. 8: p. 126].
The relationship with the Soviet Union was an important concern of the
DPRK during the early and mid-seventies. Although the Soviet Union was
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DPRK's major source of arms, its arms transfers and military assistance brought
little increased influence [Ref. 9: p. 234].
China also remained important to the DPRK during the 1970's as a
counterbalance to the Soviet domination. During the mid-seventies, China
promised military aid in the form of tanks, torpedo boat, destroyers, submarines,
and fighter planes. Chinese aid promises coincided with the victory by North
Vietnam. Encouraged by these events, Kim apparently requested support from
China to renew his war against the ROK [Ref. 8: p. 145].
However, China, like the Soviet Union, was interested in maintaining re-
lations with the U.S. Thus, the Chinese response of peaceful reunification to
Kim's request was met with polite silence.
Actual arms transfers in this period did little to improve their offensive
capabilities. They received 28 SU-7 fighter bomber aircraft in 1971, and 2
squadrons of MIG-21's. The ground forces were supplied with 50 T-62 tanks in
1975.
Defensively, the DPRK fared better during this period. Its naval capa-
bility was increased with the introduction of SS-N-2 Styx missile. Likewise, the
increased number of patrol boats and submarines gave them a better capability
to defend their coast. In 1972, 200 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles were supplied
thereby adding to its air defense capability.
Overall, during the seventies, arms transfers to the DPRK reflected the
mood of the time -- detente. The support from the Soviet Union and China
shifted toward defensive-oriented weapons.
C. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL
The ROK has experienced better military and economic support than has the
DPRK. However, their support was threatened in the early 1970's because of
political differences with its supplier, the U.S.
In 1974, the U.S. Congress was on the verge of cutting aid to protest the
political situation in the ROK when an assassination attempt by a DPRK agent
was made on President Park. Park escaped, but his wife was killed [Ref. 10:
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pp. 206-07]. This event stayed the U.S. Congress from severely cutting aid to the
ROK.
President Nixon's proclamation of a new U.S. defense policy in 1969 and the
subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division from the ROK, pushed the ROK
toward local production of arms in the mid-seventies [Ref. 11: p. 15].
President Carter's 1977 decision to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from the
ROK, although later rescinded, increased ROK's fears vastly. This led to in-
creased emphasis by the ROK to rapidly develop its arms production industries
[Ref. 12: p. 154].
Today the U.S. withdrawal has again become a big issue to the DPRK as well
as to the ROK. When and how many U.S. forces will be withdrawn from the
ROK is a concern to both nations. Because of the U.S. withdrawal, the DPRK
will lose an important political issue against the ROK, the U.S., and their own
people. The ROK is also concerned about the necessary increase in the budget
for national defense.
In January 1990 the Bush administration submitted a budget plan with de-
creased national defense expenditures, which included a reduction of a number
of military forces and bases. This plan proposed that two of the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) bases in the ROK would be closed by 1992. The USAF, however, has
played a more important role to keep the peace in Korean Peninsula than has the
U.S. ground forces. Since the reduction of the USAF assets in the ROK could
mean the beginning of a complete U.S. withdrawal, the ROK has the burden of
rebuilding the self-defense system in a short period of time.
When the U.S. withdrawal is completed, by the analysis of the ROK Ministry
of National Defense (MND), it will cost more than S5.2 billion to get the re-
placement strength. This means that the sum of added cost along with the pres-
ent expenditure for the national defense will be up to 8 percent of GNP, which
is 50 percent increase over current levels.
The effect of the U.S. withdrawal will appear in other respects besides the
increased budget for the national defense. According to the MND, in 1989 the
strength ratio, which compares ROK forces with those of DPRK, was 66 percent
I1
for ROK by itself, and only 72 percent when the resident U.S. forces were in-
cluded. With the present budget level, it will be maintained at 80 percent ROK
only and at 86 percent with the U.S. forces in 1996, assuming an expenditure of
S 62.6 billion by 1996. Table 1 shows the trends comparing ROK and DPRK
military power.
Table 1. COMPARISON OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN ROK AND
DPRK (PERCENTAGE OF DPRK, DPRK= 100)
YEAR '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85
ARMY 59.1 59.3 59.6 61.3 63.8 60.9
NAVY 49.7 49.3 53.1 59.5 55.8 59.4
A.F. 42.0 43.8 51.1 51.9 52.7 59.9
TOTAL 53.8 54.2 56.6 59.1 60.2 60.5
While the ROK economy has made excellent progress, defense spending is
reaching about 6 percent of GNP or approximately one third of the government
budget. This figure is considered high by free-world standards. Despite this high
level of spending, the imbalance of military power between ROK and DPRK re-
mains in favor of DPRK as shown table 1 [Ref. 13: p. 20].
Table 2 shows the comparative expenditures between ROK and DPRK from
1952 to i986. lfnis table reveals that since 1963, DPRK has committed over 10
percent of its GNP to defense expenditures, whereas, in the same period the ROK
has committed a relatively small portion (3-6 percent) of GNP.
As the U.S. withdrawal approaches, the cost of modernizing the military and
obtaining the higher operating efficiency becomes a major issue.
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Table 2. ROK-DPRK COMPARATIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES,
1952-1986 (UNIT: MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
ROK DPRK
YEAR
EXP. % GNP % BUD. EXP. % GNP % BUD.
1952 67 N/A NiA N, A N/A N/A
1953 154 5.7 10.1 75.4 N/A 15.2
1954 185 6.6 11.5 58.4 N/A 8.0
1955 151 5.1 10.9 61.3 N/A 6.2
1956 145 4.7 11.4 56.4 Ni/A 5.9
1957 146 5.8 13.7 54.2 N/A 5.3
1958 172 6.2 14.3 56.8 N/A 4.8
1959 ISO 6.4 15.8 61.0 NA 3.7
1960 178 6.1 15.7 61.0 N!A 3.1
1961 185 5.7 19.2 275 N/A 2.6
1962 213 5.9 25.3 305 NA 2.6
1963 177 4.2 14.9 280 12.2 1.9
1964 167 3.6 10.7 300 12.0 5.8
1965 175 3.7 11.6 350 14.0 10.1
1966 214 4.0 13.7 350 12.1 12.5
1967 238 4.1 14.2 470 15.7 30.4
1968 281 4.2 16.4 610 17.4 32.4
1969 324 4.1 17.8 615 15.4 31.0
1970 334 3.9 17.0 700 15.0 31.0
1971 394 4.3 17.3 911 17.1 34.1
1972 443 4.4 18.2 584 13.8 17.0
1973 470 3.9 13.3 630 14.0 15.4
1974 601 3.2 15.6 765 15.8 16.1
1975 730 3.8 18.0 950 16.3 16.4
1976 1460 6.2 19.5 1030 11.2 16.7
1977 2033 6.6 19.1 1060 10.5 16.6
1978 2586 5.6 19.0 1230 11.4 16.0
1979 3219 6.4(est) N A 2900 20.6 15.0
1980 4400 6.1 33.2 N:A N A N A
1981 4500 7.1 N, A 1700 9.0 N'A
1982 4600 7.0 34.0 1700 10.5 N/A
1983 NA NA N A 1900 N A N,,A
1984 4300 4.8 NA NiA NA N/A
1985 4600 N!A 33.6 4200 N'A N"A
1986 4700 N'A 31.2 N A NiA N.A
Source : Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook
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il1. OVERVIEW OF ROK'S LOGISTICS
A. KOREAN WAR LOGISTICS
When the Korean War broke out, the ROK forces had only basic weapons
which were considered adequate for national security. The heaviest weapons the
ROK Army possessed were twenty-seven armoured vehicles and eighty-nine 105
mm howitzers which were of good design, but had short range. Fifteen percent
of these weapons were useless, and thirty-five percent of the vehicles were out of
commission. The ammunition on hand was sufficient only for a few days.
Since the ROK forces did not have adequate supply stocks, they were sup-
plied by the U.S. forces during the war. From this point of view, the Korean
War was the first example of supplier; recipient independence in a limited war due
to a polarized world environment [Ref. 14: p. 5].
When the first unit, the 24th U.S. Infantry Division, deployed in the Korean
Peninsula on I July 1950, the Far East Command (FEC) decided that the Eighth
U.S. Army, located in Japan under FEC, was responsible for all logistical support
for the forces in the ROK, except air and water transport. In addition, it decided
to establish a base section in the ROK and maintain a minimum of a 45-day re-
serve of supplies in Japan, a figure later to be increased to 120 days [Ref. 15:
p. 5].
Although the Eighth Army was not committed to combat, its logistical net-
work was immediately set into motion. The directive to support ground forces in
the ROK called for immediate utilization of stocks on hand at various depots in
Japan.
When FEC alerted the divisions for deployment to the ROK, there were
shortages of many required supplies. In the hurried effort to fill these shortages,
established supply procedures were often ignored. This resulted in the issue of
supplies without requisition and a loss of accountability. This way of issuing
supplies also allowed unauthorized stock levels and receipt of supplies and
equipment by units which were not authorized by Table of Organization (TO&E)
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or other regulations. In other words, it became a "first-come-first-served" supply
system.
Before deploying the U.S. forces to the ROK, the Logistical Plan for Eighth
Army divisions was published as follows: [Ref. 16: p. 3)
• Units transported by air would carry a basic load of ammunition and a
three-day supply of rations.
" Units moving by water would take two basic loads of ammunition and a
15-day supply of Classes 1, 11, 111, and IV supplies. 5-day supply would be
in the hands of troop units and 10-day supply in the division trains.
" Combat accounting of supplies would be placed in effect upon movement
alert.
* The Eighth Army would provide automatic resupply of all Classes of sup-
plies to the units in fifteen days.
At that time, the planners could not know how many units would be in the
war, nor how quickly they would be alerted for the war. As the result of all the
divisions deploying, the logisticians found it difficult to outfit later divisions with
initial load levels.
For units deploying later, combat service support group made an intense
search to locate the required ammunition loads. The earlier deployed units had
taken more than their share of ammunition and other supplies. This condition
resulted again, because the logisticians did not expect that all units would be de-
ploying.
After the participation of United Nations forces in the Korean War, the
mission of Eighth Army was directed to provide logistical support to all of them
in the ROK. These multiple support taskings were imposed on a logistics system
that was operating at far less than 100 percent efficiency. The system already
suffered from a lack of properly trained personnel, equipment shortage, and per-
sonnel shortages.
During the offensive period, as the main operations were going on, the units
to be supplied were diverted, and consequently, it made the supplies delayed to
the other units. As a result of this, stock levels of ammunition at the supply
points were rapidly reaching the critical state. Some of the items had dipped be-
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low the required stock level and as far as down to a one day supply of items re-
maining on hand.
As the time passed, the tactical situation was continuously changed because
of the rapid movement of units. Although a forward supply distribution point
was established, the delivery of the supplies was delayed, since, in addition to the
rapid movement, units were also widely dispersed. Also, the long distance for
supply made it more difficult because of the limitation of available transporta-
tion.
Consequently, during the Korean War, some problems encountered were:
shortage of personnel and inadequately trained personnel in combat service; in-
adequate and often lack of war time policies for supporting units; improper
command and responsibility alignment of support to support units.
B. ROK ARMY INVENTORY SYSTEM
The ROK logistics, as mentioned above, was dependent on the U.S. Army
during the Korean War. The ROK Army neglected the importance of the logistic
system because the U.S. forces undertook the responsibility for it during both the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. Considerable efforts have been made to develop lo-
gistics plans to support credible strategic and tactical doctrines. However, the
ROK Army, still thinks of logistics as being of secondary concern.
Before the late 1960's, the ROK did not produce arms. The supplies from the
U.S. under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) were an adequate source of
resupply. Therefore, during that period, the ROK's logistic system was based on
a "continuous refill system." This system allowed users to draw on stocks without
regard for the cost. Reorders were paid for with MAP funds. As a result, fi-
nancial responsibility was not enforced.
However, this system did not last long. As the threat from the DPRK in-
creased because of the arms it produced, the ROK forces needed to get more ca-
pable and modernized weapons. The acquisition and maintenance costs of newer
arms were too high, however.
Moreover, the changes in the conditions, such as the withdrawal of the 7th
U.S. infantry division from the ROK on 21 March 1971, the fall of Vietnam to
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the Communists in 1975, and the plan to withdraw U.S. forces from the ROK
by the Carter administration, pushed the ROK to begin arms production.
The first efforts to produce arms occurred in the mid-seventies. By these ef-
forts, the domestic demand for arms was satisfied in 1975, and the surplus was
exported to friendly nations. Since most of these arms were produced under li-
cense or by using the Technical Data Package from the U.S. rather than by ori-
ginal development, arms export was restricted by the U.S. government.
Therefore, those industries produced only the planned quantity of the arms,
equipment, etc., which were requested by the ROK MND. So, in this period,
with the exception of critical items, the ROK logistic system became a "plan-
produced supply support system within the budget."
In the late 1970's the U.S. security assistance policy toward the ROK under-
went a tremendous change. When the ROK MND assumed increased responsi-
bility for its own defense, it realized the need for a better and more efficient
allocation of defense resources.
As a result, the ROK Army developed the Planning, Programming, Budget-
ing. Executing and Evaluation System (PPBEES), which was based on the U.S.'s
Planning. Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS), to meet the ROK military
needs [Ref. 17: p. 86].
The main idea of PPBEES is to establish a bridge between planning and
programming and to feed back the result of performance evaluations for later use.
This system also aims to develop a sound Dcfense Resource Sy-stem by adding the
execution and evaluation phases to the previous budget system. Consequently,
the PPBEES is now applied to the logistic system in the ROK.
C. PROBLEMS IN ROK INVENTORY SYSTEM
The object of logistics is essentially the movement and support of forces in the
field and to ensure the operation of weapons on the battlefield. Logistics gener-
ally can be classified as material management and physical distribution. Army
logistics usually deals with material management that includes the following
functions: requirement, procurement and acquisition, inventory control, distrib-
ution, maintenance and salvage of supplies. Basically, the primary purpose of
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logistics is to develop and maintain maximum combat po,, 2r through the support
of weapon systems.
Rapid changes in weapons and equipment in the recent period are increasing
the importance of logistics. Also, its importance is focusing on the support and
distribution of war materials during a future war, because the ROK now has the
defense industries and has assumed responsibility for these functions.
In peace time, ROK Army logisticians continuously work to maintain the
combat power of personnel and equipment, to prepare for a sudden invasion from
the DPRK. However, when evaluating and discussing the results of the field
training exercises, they always bring up the questions about how much ammuni-
tion, fuel, and the other supplies are needed, and whether it is possible to get
those items in the quantity needed within the required time.
in the ROK Army, there are some expressions used to define the quantity of
the supplies, for example: the basic load of ammunition. the required supply rate
of ammunition, and conLrol supply rate of ammunition. The basic load of am-
munition means the amount that the unit could carry with its own transportation.
The required supply rate of ammunition specifies the number of rounds per
weapon per day needed to sustain operations of designated force without re-
striction for a specific period. Finally, the control supply rate limits the number
of rounds which a weapon should use in a day or a certain period throughout the
war.
Actually, it is impossible to figure out the real quantity of supplies needed
during war time. Therefore, the designated numbers of those quantities have
been estimated from simulations of war games, or from the Field Manual, or
from actual data taken from the Korean War.
The other factor affecting the ROK Army system is the budget. After the
success of the Economic Development Plans since 1961, the ROK has experienced
rapid economic modernization transforming them from one of the most backward
countries in Asia to one of the most advanced. As the economic situation has
improved, the size of budget has grown larger and larger. Consequently, the
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budget for national defense has grown to around 30 percent of the national
budget in the ROK.
To compensate for the U.S. withdrawal and for the modernization of the
ROK forces, a larger budget is expected to be needed in the near future. In-
creasing the budget for national defense is, however, not desirable for the ROK
government. Therefore, means to increase the effectiveness of current spending
need to be found.
This budgetary limitation affects the ROK Army. Therefore, the quantity
of supplies that can be maintained for a future war within a limited budget has
become a major issue in the ROK Army. Since ammunition and fuel are critical
materials during a war, this thesis is focused on the computation of the cost and
the service level for these supplies which can be acquired within the present
budget. Cost analysis is used to examine the efficiencies in service levels and




IV. COST ANALYSIS WITH MULTIPLE ITEMS
A. INVENTORY COST
The objective of inventory management is to have the appropriate amounts
of raw materials, supplies, and finished goods in the right place, at the right time,
and at low cost. Inventory costs are associated with the operation of an inventory
system and result from action or lack of action on the part of management in es-
tablishing the system. They are the basic economic parameters to any inventory
decision model, and the more relevant ones to most systems are itemized as fol-





Note that for a particular inventory item, only those cost elements that are
incremental (out of pocket) are pertinent in the analysis.
1. Purchase Cost
Purchase cost of an item is the unit purchase price if it is obtained from
an external source, or the unit production cost if it is internally produced. The
unit cost should always be taken as the cost of the item as it is placed in inven-
tory. For purchase items, it is the purchase price plus any freight cost. For
manufacturing items, the unit cost includes direct labor, direct material, and fac-
tory overhead. The purchase cost is modified for different quantity levels when
a supplier offers quantity discounts [Ref. 18: pp. 13-14].
2. Order/Setup Cost
The order, setup cost originates from the expense of issuing a purchase
order to an outside supplier or from internal production setup costs. This cost is
usually assumed to vary directly with the number of orders or setups placed and
not at all with the size of the order. The order cost includes such items as making
requisitions, analyzing vendors, writing purchase orders, receiving materials, in-
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specting materials, following up orders, and doing the paperwork necessary to
complete the transaction. The setup cost comprises the costs of changing over the
production process to produce the ordered item. It usually includes preparing the
shop order, scheduling the work, preproduction setup, expediting, and quality
acceptance [Ref. 18: p.141.
3. Holding Cost
The holding cost, synonymous with carrying cost, subsumes the costs as-
sociated with investing in inventory and maintaining the physical investment in
storage. It incorporates such items as capital costs, taxes, insurance, handling,
shortage, shrinkage, obsolescence, and deterioration. Capital cost reflects lost
earning power or opportunity cost. If the funds were invested elsewhere, a return
on the investment would be expected. Capital cost is a charge that accounts for
this unreceived return. Many states treat inventories as taxable property; so the
more you have, the higher the taxes. Insurance coverage requirements are de-
pendent on the amount to be replaced if property is destroyed. Insurance pre-
miums vary with the size of the inventory investment. Obsolescence is the risk
that an item will lose value because of shifts in styles or consumer preference.
Shrinkage is the decrease in inventory quantities over time from loss or theft.
Deterioration means a change in properties due to age or environmental degra-
dation. Many items are age-controlled and must be sold or used before an expi-
ration date. The usual simpifying assumption made in inventory management is
that holding costs are proportional to the size of the inventory investment. On
an annual basis, they most commonly range from 20 to 40 % of the investment.
In line with this assumption is the practice of establishing the holding cost of in-
ventory items as a percentage of their dollar value [Ref. 18: p. 14].
4. Stockout Cost
The stockout cost is the economic consequence of an external or internal
shortage. An external shortage occurs when a customer's order is not filled; an
internal shortage occurs when an order of a group or department within the or-
ganization is not filled. External shortages can incur backorder costs, present
profit loss, and future profit loss. Internal shortages can result in lost production
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and a delay in a completion date. The extent of the cost depends on the reaction
of the customer to the out-of-stock condition. If demand occurs for an item out
of stock, the economic loss depends on whether the shortage is backordered, sat-
isfied by substitution of another item, or canceled. In the one situation, the sales
is not lost but only delayed a few days in shipment. Typically a company would
expedite an emergency backorder for the item and assume any extra costs
charged for the special service. In another situation, the sale is lost. The actual
cost is less identifiable in this case but ranges from the apparent profit loss on the
sale to loss of goodwill, which can be hard to specify. It can be seen that the
stockout cost can vary considerably from item to item, depending on customer
response or internal practice. It can be extremely high if the missing item forces
a production line to shut down or causes a customer to go elsewhere in the future.
The quantification of these costs has long been a difficult and unsatisfactorily
resolved issue.
The central objective of inventory management is usually the minimiza-
tion of the costs. Only those costs which change as the level of inventory changes
should be considered in any analysis. For example, amounts expended on heat-
ing, lighting and security services for a warehouse should be disregarded if they
do not change as stock levels vary [Ref. 18: pp. 14-15].
B. CONCEPT OF COST ANALYSIS
1. Conditions for the Use of Cost Analysis
In the typical continuous review inventory system, such as a deterministic
model, a stochastic model, and a single period model, we can determine the opti-
mal order quantity and the reorder point for a given time by minimizing the an-
nual variable costs. However, it is, sometimes, not appropriate to apply these
models to the real world inventory systems which have multiple items with con-
straints, like a budget constraint. Because of these constraints, the result which
minimizes the total variable cost may not be always in the feasible region. Now,
we turn our attention to the main point, namely a multi-item inventory system
with a budget constraint.
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After the Korean War, the ROK government increased its military ex-
penditure as shown in table 2. Spending for national defense increased up to 30
percent of the national budget since 1978. With the added burden caused by the
U.S. decision to withdraw its forces from the ROK, the pressure to expand de-
fense spending has increased. Because of this, the government has put tight
controls on any spending growth.
In the future, war is likely to last for only a short period of time, because
of the development of high-tech arms and their applications in war. If there is
another war, on-hand stocks may be the only support available. Therefore the
support of the logistics system becomes a critical problem.
To support the ROK Army's ability to fight, the conditions mentioned
above are extremely critical. Therefore a proper model must be developed to ex-
plore the possible outcomes. This model must reflect the following circumstances
and assumptions:
* The next war will be conventional.
• The war will not last more than 5 days.
* The resupply of critical items will take 2 days after the war breaks out and
can occur only once during the war period.
* There are sufficient vehicles to support the resupply efforts.
* No substitutions for critical items are allowed.
* The demands for the critical items are independent and normally distrib-
uted.
0 There is a budget constraint which limits the size of inventory.
In this thesis,
* We concentrate on fuel and ammunitions as our critical items.
* We use a 105 mm artillery battalion to demonstrate the models.
* The battalion has maintenance ability and repair parts for 2 weeks.
The objective is to compute the present service levels of critical items
within the given budget size, and to determine whether the budget is being used
effectively. The cost analysis with the Lagrangian multiplier method is used.
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2. Cost Analysis Approach
In inventory problems, the Lagrange multiplier is the value or cost per
unit of resources: It represents the amount by which the minimum cost can be
reduced by adding one additional unit of limiting resource. The Lagrange mul-
tiplier can be used to consider imputed values or shadow prices of resources.
To minimize a function f(X,,..., X,) subject to an equality constraint
g(X,..., X,) = a , where both functions are continuous and differentiable, we have
to find a stationary point for the unconstrained function
L(X1 ,..., X,,;) ==f(X1,..., X') + )[g(X ... , Xn) - a]
where
A = nonnegati,e Lagrange multiplier
That is, we look for a point that satisfies
_L f +l g
-k " + -
L (g - 0
where
j= l,2,...,n
By simultaneously solving the above equations for A; and A the minimum
point f(XJ..., A,) if obtained (Ref. 18: pp. 296-297).
In general, when the objective function is to minimize the expected num-












n = the number of different items
ti = priority or weight of item i
A! = the number of item i demanded
f1 (Af) = the probability density function of A!
Bi = the number of item i which iN on-hand
Al - Bi = size of stockout
Ci = unit cost for the item i
S = the total budget
Since the budget constraint is binding we obtain:
nIn
L = tf (f - Bi)f(M)dM + . CiBi - S
i=1 B _=
In this thesis, we are concerned with only two critical items -- ammunition
and fuel. Therefore the value of n is 2. To solve the formula, we will take the
partial derivatives of L with respect to B1,B2 and 2, which are set equal to zero.
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2 2
L = Ztj CO(A! - B.;fj(M)dM + {Z CJBI - s] (3)
= B1 -i=l
For the partial derivative of B,, we get
aB 
- [tj (A! - BI)fl(M)dM + 2CB 1]
- tj f' 1(M)dM + ;c1
- tlPI(M > B1) + )C1
=0
Therefore
tj Pj(M > B1 )
Cl
By the same procedure, we get
t2 P2(M > B2 )
C2
From these two formulas, we get
tl P(A! > B)= t2P2 (M > B 2)
C, C2
or
P2 (M > B,) ti C2  tj C 2- x - x (4)
PI(M > BI) C t2 t2 C1
where
P(.I[ > Bi) = probability of stockout of item i
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From the partial derivative of 2, we get
PL2 C I B I + C2B2 - S = 0
C1 B + C2B2 = S (5)
It means the ratio of a stockout probability of an item multiplied by its
weight over the cost should be equal for each item. That is, if the actual ratio of
two stockout probabilities is different from the mathematical computation calcu-
lated by equation ( 4 ), the budget should be reallocated to optimize its effective-
ness. We can adjust the stockout probabilities of other items in the multi-items
inventory system within a budget constraint by changing the stockout probability
of an item. In this case, the budget is equal to the sum of the number of each
item multiplied by each cost.
3. A Procedure of Applying Cost Analysis
First, we have to compute the required quantity for the critical items
during the future war period (in this thesis, for ammunition and fuel during 5
days). We can figure them out on the basis of the control supply rate (CSR).
Second. we compute the total cost of each item by multiplying the cost
by the quantity needed for the period.
Third, we compute the sum of each total cost. This sum is equal to the
budget for the items - in our case, ammunition and fuel.
Fourth, we find the demand for those items. We can use the data from
the Korean War and some assumptions.
Fifth, we consider the type of demand generation probability distrib-
utions. In this thesis, we assume the normal distribution is fitted for both items.
Sixth, we compute the service level for each item.
27
Seventh, we give them a priority to purchase or acquire the item by its
importance to perform a war. In this thesis, we assume that the priority is equal
between ammunition and fuel.
Finally, we ensure that the budget is being effectively used. If the budget
is not being used effectively, we have to find out new service levels which satisfy
the conditions ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) by iterative method.




As the U.S. withdrawal from the ROK is in progress, the ROK Army
must consider the effective operation of artillery which is suitable to the Korean
terrain characteristics and which best satisfies the mission. During the Korean
War, artillery played a major role to support the infantry forces and it is still
evaluated as a main ground power in a future war.
An analysis of the last war, however, shows that the ROK artillery did
not perform its mission effectively because it lacked repair parts, maintenance
ability, and ammunition prior to the arrival of U.S. support.
To prepare for self defense without U.S. support, the ROK government
has invested a large portion of its budget since the early seventies in the develop-
ment of defense industries. As the defense industries developed, the problems
caused by the lack of repair parts and maintenance ability have been overcome.
Nevertheless, the pre'--... of ammunition supply still remains unsolved. An ad-
ditional problem ,.i- of having adequate stocks of fuel, must also be solved.
A resulL of developing the defense industries has been the modernization
of artillery. A new gun barrel for the 105 mm howitzer was developed, which
increased the range from 12 km to 15 km. Additionally, industry developed a
new model, KH178 105 mm Howitzer, which is very suitable to the Korean situ-
ation, and has been produced since 1984. It is now in service in the ROK Army,
and can use all the current standard 105 mm ammunitions. Table 3 lists perti-
nent data on the weapon.
Table 3. CHARACTERISTIC OF 105 MM KH 178 LIGHT HOWITZER
Specifications Descriptions Specifications Descriptions
Calibre 105 mm Rate of Fire 15 rpm (max)
5rpm(sustained)
Max Range HE : 14.7 km Towing Vehicle 2 1/'2 ton truck
IRAP: 18.0 km
Source : Jane's Armour and Artillery 1984 - 1985
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According to the current operation plan, if war breaks out, the unit
should act as described in the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). The SOP
directs them to arrange their forces into the designated position, and bring the
ammunition from their own stores. On the basis of the ROK Army regulation,
the quantity of the supplies to be maintained in the units is specified by the
Control Supply Rate (CSR). For example, the supplies which should be on hand
are as much as the unit can use during a war for 3 days by CSR. Table 4 shows
an illustration of CSR.
Table 4. EXAMPLE: CONTROL SUPPLY RATE PER UNIT
Subject Number/unit Description C S R
105mm Howitzer Is Ammunition 180 rounds/day
2 12 ton Truck 61 Fuel 41 gallons day
For computing the demand rate for ammunition, we can use any of three
bases: war game result, Field Manual (FM) data, or Korean war data. Since the
war game data is dependent upon the situation, and FM data were not drawn
from actual experience, Korean War data is the best choice and is used for the
basis of the computation in this thesis. The data assumes a consumption rate for
a modern war will be greater than the historical Korean War figures. This de-
mand is deemed to have a normal distribution, with a mean which is found by
multiplying 2.5 times the mean of day of supply during the Korean War, and a
standard deviation as the square root of mean. Table 5 shows the day of supply
during the Korean War for 105 mm Howitzer ammunition.
Table 5. DAY OF SUPPLY IN THE KOREAN WAR [Ref. 19: p. 35]
Far East CommandWeapon 1July50 14July50 6Oct50 1Sep51 1Nov51 1July52 Average
105 mmHowizer 30 180 30 40 55 55 65Howitzer
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There are no data available for fuel use during the Korean war. There-
fore, we assume the demand is normally distributed, with a mean of 26 gallons
per day, which is the amount considered as the average usage rate at present time
in the ROK, and with a standard deviation of 8.7.
For the purpose of illustration, it may be useful to first present the sta-
tistical consideration, second compute the cost and service level, and finally ana-
lyze the result of the computation.
2. Statistical Consideration
Since it is impossible to resupply war materials more than one time
throughout the war period, and the demand is noncontinuous, changeable, and
short-time lived, the single order quantity model is suitable. (Appendix A)
In general when an item in multi-items inventory system are intended for
only internal use with no generation of revenue, the selection of single order size
is based on the lowest expected cost. The cost components are order cost, pur-
chase cost, stockout cost and salvace value.
The following formula is for the expected cost of a single order for a con-
tinuous distribution [Ref. 18: pp. 310-312].
EC = C + PQ + A (M - Q)F(M)dI - Vj(Q - M)F(M)dM
Q 0
= C + PQ + (A - V) (M - O)f(M)dM + v(M -Q)
Q
where
EC = expected cost
C = order cost
P = unit purchase cost
Q = single order quantity
A = stockout cost per unit
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M = demand
M - 0 = size of stockout
fiM) =probability density function of demand
V = salvage value
To determine the minimum expected cost for continuous distribution re-
quires taking the derivatives of expected cost with respect to the order size and
setting it equal to zero. It can be stated mathematically as
dEC -P-(A- V')P( >0)- V=0
dQ
Therefore
P- VP(M>Q)- -" (6)
= optimum stockout probability
This formula implies that if purchase cost is equal to or greater than the
stockout cost, the desired stockout probability is 1. Under these conditions, no
orders would be instituted until a known demand existed. Also, if an item has
P
no salvage value, the optimum probability of stockout is P(M > Q) = A Thus,
if the demand for the item is normally distributed with a known mean W and
standard deviation a, the following expression determines the lowest expected cost
single order quantity:
Q0 = M + Z7
= optimum single order size (7)
where Z is the normal standard deviate obtained from the normal table for the
stockout probability of P(M > Q).
However, the most common situation is when an organization does not
know its stockout cost or feels very uneasy about estimating it. Under this con-
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dition, it is common for management to set service levels which indicate the abil-
ity to meet customer demands from stock [Ref. 18: p. 211].
Figure 1 shows the concept of stockout probability. In this figure, the
portion on the right side of Q under the curve is the probability of stockout. Since
there is no salvage value for either items at the end of the war period, we can
calculate the service level by using the following formula.
Service level = 1 - P(M > Q)
= P(M _ Q)
P( < -Mo _ ) (8)
=P(Z<
Returning to the main problem, we have two items -- ammunition and
fuel -- demands for which are normally distributed. Since we know the value of
Q, F and a, we can get the Z value from the standard normal distribution table.
3. Computation of Cost and Service Level for each Item
We now consider how to compute the cost and the service level. In our
problem, it is very important to make an economic decision for the logistic sup-
port because of the budget constraint. In the ROK, since the purchase costs are
about 113 U.S. dollars for a round of 105 mm Howitzer and about 4 U.S. dollars
for a gallon of fuel, we can compute the total cost by using the CSR of each item.
a. Total Cost
The acquired rounds of ammunition during the war time can be
computed as
180 rounds/day Howitzer x 5 days x 18 Howitzers = 16,200 rounds
Therefore, the total cost is
16,200 rounds x S 113/ round = S1,830,600







Figure I. Example: Density Function Curve
41 gallons/ day truck x 5 days x 61trucks = 12,505 gallons
Therefore, we get the total cost as
12,505 gallons x S4/ gallon = S50,020
To find the total budget, we can compute the sum of the total costs
for each item by using Equation ( 5 ). From this equation,
S = C1 Q + C 2Q2
= S 1,830,600 + S50,020
= S1,880,620
b. Service Level
For ammunition, the demand is normally distributed with a mean
162.5 rounds/day and standard deviation 12.75. Figure 2 shows the demand
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Q-MService Level = P(Z -
P(Z_< 180 - 162.5
12.7 5
= P(Z <_ 1.3725)
= 0.9151
That is, the stockout probability of ammunition is 1.00 - 0.9151 -
0.0849 or 8.49 percent. This means that the probability the demand exceeds the
quantity of CSR is 8.49 percent.
Since the demand is normally distributed with a mean 26 gallons /
day and a standard deviation 8.7, as Figure 3, we can get the service level as
Service Level -P(Z < Q )
SP(Z_ !&41 -26
8.7
= P(Z < 1.7241)
= 0.9577
That means the probability of stockout is 1.00 - 0.9577 = 0.0423 or
4.23 percent. The results say that if we provide ammunition and fuel in accord-
ance with the CSR, the service level will be 91.51 percent for ammunition and
95.77 percent for fuel. The total system service level, definded as the probability
will have enough fuel AND enough ammunition, is 87.64 percent (0.9151 x
0.9577 = 0.8764).
4. Analysis
In this thesis we are interested in three points: how much funding is
needed, what are the service levels related to the funding level, whether the
budget is being used effectively.
For the funding we need S1,880,620 as computed by CSR, and the service
level, as previously calculated, is 91.51 percent for ammunition and 95.77 percent
for fuel. With these results, we can examine whether the budget is being used





ti = priority of item i
Pi(M > Qi) = stockout probability of item i
Ci = purchase cost of item i
When a war breaks out, we need on average 2925 rounds and 1586 gal-
lons for a day. Assuming the importance of the 2925 rounds is equal to that of
the 1586 gallons, and setting the priority of fuel at 1, we get the priority of am-
munition, which is 0.54. Subscript 1 is used to indicate ammunition, and sub-
script 2 indicates fuel. Thus:
t I = 0.54
t2 = 1
At this point all the data is in hand to calculate the optimal service levels
within the budget. The first step is to calculate the "CSR-based service level ra-
tio." This is done by taking the ratio of the probabilities that demand exceeds the
CSR quantity for the critical items. Thus:
P2( "f > Q2) 0.0423 = 04P1A'>Q)- 0 -84 0.982P (,V > Qj) 0.0849
The next step is to find the optimizing ratio based on the budget, which
we term the "budget ratio." From the equation ( 4 ) we get:
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Thus the CSR-based ratio is greater than the budget ratio of stockout
probabilities. In order to optimize the allocation of the budget the ratios must
be equal. Therefore funds must be shifted from ammunition to fuel. By equating
the two values, we increase the stockout probability of ammunition and decrease
that of fuel. Since in this case the budget constraint is binding, we must adjust
the stockout probabilities through an iterative process to find the optimal point.
Table 6 shows the iterative computations.
Table 6. COMPUTATION OF RATIO FOR STOCKOUT PROBABILITIES
Level 0 02 P1()I > Q1) PA(I > Q) Ratio
1 180.000 41.000 0.08492 0.04233 0.49823
2 179.000 49.336 0.09780 0.00378 0.03783
3 178.700 51.837 0.10115 0.00150 0.01483
4 178.780 51.170 0.10084 0.00190 0.01884
5 178.783 51.145 0.10081 0.00190 0.01885
6 178.785 51.128 0.10077 0.00192 0.01902
7 178.786 51.120 0.10076 0.00193 0.01912
8 178.787 51.112 0.10074 0.00194 0.01926
The above table shows that the closest ratio to the sought mathematical
value is at level 7. This means that the optimal quantity of CSR is 178.786
rounds of ammunition and 51.120 gallons of fuel. The optimal service level for
ammunition is therefore 0.89924, while that of fuel is 0.99807. The total system
service level is 89.75 percent, an increase of over 2 percent.
To achieve level 7, the funds which must be shifted from ammunition to
fuel is calculated as:




(51.120 - 41)gallons/truck day x 61trucks x 5days x S41gallon = S12,346.4
In this example the improvement by using our method was considerable.
It must be stressed, however, that these are not actual data, and that actual data
may require insignificant changes to realize the optimal levels. Table 7 summa-
rizes the war fighting capability (system service level) before and after applying
the model to our data.




CSR-based 0.9151 0.9577 0.8764
Optimized 0.8992 0.9981 0.8975
Thus by changing the service levels to make the budget more effective, a
gain of 0.0211 percent is realized. Note that this decreases the risk of being short
by 17 percent (2.11 / (1.00 - 0.8764) = 17.07). This is calculated as the product
of the service levels. From these results, we can say that when the budget is re-
allocated to make the CSR-based ratio equal to the budget ratio, we can increase




Based on the experience of the Korean War, it is natural that the ROK Army
should focus on more effective and efficient management of defense resources.
Since the U.S. forces provided logistic support for both the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, the ROK Army gained little experience or data on logistics. As a result,
their logistics system has been very dependent on the Field Manual or on the re-
cords acquired from other countries based on other wars. Such facts are not well
fitted to the Korean situation.
Moreover, the atmosphere of detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
and the collapse of the Berlin Wall causes the U.S. government to reduce its mil-
itary budget. Consequently, the U.S. plans to withdraw its forces from ROK.
This plan forces the ROK government to increase funding for their national de-
fense.
Therefore, it is very important that the budget be used effectively to acceler-
ate the modernization of forces so as to maintain a military balance in the Korean
Peninsula, without straining its budget. Furthermore, a future war could occur
with very short notice, and end rapidly since both Koreas have high-tech weapon
systems. As a result, it is critically important that the ROK logistics inventory
system make maximum use of its limited budget to provide the best possible ser-
vice levels for war critical items.
Because the size of the budget is constrained, we must effectively allocate it
so as to adjust the critical item service levels, thereby maximizing our war fighting
capability.
A main problem of this study is that since we cannot calculate the demand
for the critical items perfectly, we have to depend on the data from the last war.
This decreases the credibility of the study. To improve this weakness, we could
apply the data from the simulation of war game models, which are designed to
simulate the Korean terrain characteristics and military situation. This data was
not available for this study, however.
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It is emphasized that the cost analysis method is suggested not for merely
saving the budget, but for using it most effectively in preparation for a future
war. Judgement will always be required because of the difficulties in assessing the
exact essentiality of critical items, and to determine if the assumptions coincided
x ith the real situation.
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APPENDIX A. SINGLE ORDER QUANTITY
The single order quantity model is concerned with the planning and control
of inventory items that are purchased only once during a time period, or for
which only one production run may be initiated.
This model is very well suited to demand that is noncontinuous, changeable,
and short-lived. It is specifically applicable to the following two categories of
demand: (1) demand which exists for an item at frequent intervals and (2) un-
certain demand which exists for a short-lived item at frequent intervals. The first
category is typified by promotional and fad items ordered by retail stores and by
spare parts for maintenance repair. The second category is associated with highly
perishable items.
Due to its common association with the second category, the single order
quantity problem is frequently referred to in the literature as the Christmas tree
problem or the Newsboy problem.
Single order quantity items have a demand pattern with a limited sales (or
usage) period. An item is order at the beginning of the period, and there is no
opportunity for a second order during the period, since a second order would not
arrive before the end of the period.
The single order quantity problems can be classified according to source, de-
mand, and lead time. The source of single order quantity may be self-supply or
outside supply. Self-supply exists when the organization produces the item itself,
whereas outside exists when another organization is the supply source. With
self-supply, the lead time is mainly composed of production scheduling, manu-
facturing, and assembly time. With outside supply, the lead time also includes
the transit and receipt times.
The determination or estimation of the demand is critical in dealing with a
single order. If the demand is known, the problem is simplified. If the demand
follows some specified or empirical distribution, the problem can be solved by the
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techniques of decision making under risk. With no information concerning the
demand, it becomes necessary to do market analysis or market research.
The lead time has a different significance with the single order than with the
repeat order. With a repeat order and on going demand, the lead time is a com-
plication, since demand occurs during the lead time. With a single order, there
is no demand, or at any rate, there is no stock available to satisfy demand during
the lead time. The lead time is thus the waiting time until goods are available to
meet demand. Until the goods arrive, there is no stock available. If the lead time
is longer than expected, some sales may be lost. If the lead time is shorter than
expected, the stock is available prior to demand.
A. KNOWN DEMAND, KNOWN LEAD TIME
When the demand is known and the lead time is known, there is no single
order inventory problem. The quantity of goods ordered matches the demand,
and they arrive on the day of demand origination. A condition of certainty exists
which rarely occurs in practice. For this condition to exist, all demand must re-
sult in backorders from patient customers, or all planning must be perfect with
no unusual occurrences or delays.
B. KNOWN DEMAND, VARIABLE LEAD TIME
Since the demand is known, the size of the single order is known. With a
variable lead time, the decision maker wants to ensure that the order is received
prior to demand, so there is no idle production time or lost sales. If no lost sales
are to be tolerated, orders are placed prior to the maximum possible lead time.
If a lead time distribution can be ascertained, a lead time can be selected which
has a high probability of arrival prior to demand. Alternatively, if the demand
is fixed regardless of when the goods are delivered, a late delivery only delays an
activity. This situation could exist in the construction of a building, where a de-
livery delay would only result in a construction delay.
When self-supply exists, the variable lead time is a result of uncertainties in
scheduling and in the production processes. A service level policy on the lead
time can be obtained from a PERT analysis.
43
C. VARIABLE DEMAND, KNOWN LEAD TIME
When the demand is variable and the lead time is known, the single order
inventory problem is in ascertaining the order size. If the demand is not known
but the probability distribution of demand is available, thL problem can be solved
as decision making under risk. The order size that results in the largest expected
profit or lowest expected cost is selected.
The procedure for decision making under risk is to determine the demand
strategy with the optimum expected value. The probability that the demand will
be less than or equal to the single order quantity for a discrete distribution is as
follows:
Q Mmax
P(M < Q) Z " P(M) = I - P(,1Mf)
M=O M=Q+I
where
Q = single order quantity in units
M[ demand in units(a random variable)
P(M) = probability of a demand of N1 units
A/max = maximum demand in units
The probability that the demand will exceed the single order quantity is as fol-
lows:
Mm Q
P( >Q)= Z P(M) -ZP(- - l)
M=Q+I Af=0
The procedure for calculating the expected value of each discrete demand strategy
Q, is as follows:
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= expected value of strategy Qi
where F(Q2,,j) is the outcome of following the demand strategy Q when the actual
demand is the state of nature A'l. The determination of outcomes can take on two
forms, depending on whether the amount ordered (Q,) is less than or greater than
the demand level (M). When the outcomes are expressed in profit or benefit
terms, the following relationships apply:
F(Q, Ifj) = Q1J for Q - Afj (understock condition)
F(Q, Mj) = AIJ- (Qi - Mj)l for Qj > A! (overstock condition)
where
J = unit profit or benefit
I= loss from disposition of unutilized unit
Q= single order quantiv of J units
M.I = demand level of j units
0, - Afj = number of units overstocked
When outcomes are expressed in cost or sacrifice items, the following relation-
ships apply:
F(QIMj) = QP for Qi Atj (overproduction condition)
F(QlMf) = QIP + (Al. - Q,)A for Qi < AMj (underproduc:ion condition)
where
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P = unit cost
A = stockout cost per unit
Aj- Qj= size of stockout in units
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